The Right to Community? (reviewing \u3ci\u3eThe Community of Rights\u3c/i\u3e by Alan Gewirth) by Bhabha, Jacqueline
The Right to Community?
Jacqueline Bhabhat
The Community of Rights. Alan Gewirth. University of Chicago
Press, 1996. Pp xvi, 380.
Does the modern state have a duty to implement basic eco-
nomic and social rights for its population? If so, what program of
action should the state adopt to realize this obligation?
At the dawn of a new American presidential term, as af-
firmative action programs come under severe threat and welfare
entitlements are abolished, the answer to the first is increasingly
negative (and the second therefore irrelevant). Conversely, in the
realm of public international law, the human rights regime es-
tablished after World War II answered the first question with a
qualified affirmative. States have an obligation to promote the
economic and social rights of their citizens insofar as they have
the available resources to do so. Unlike the absolute and immedi-
ately binding standard imposed with respect to such rights as
freedom of thought, and protection from torture or arbitrary dep-
rivation of life,' the requirements on states to provide food,
housing, medical care, and basic education were formulated in
terms of contingency and progressive realization.2 As to the sec-
ond question, it was left up to states to decide what steps their
resources permitted them to take to realize economic and social
rights. The international monitoring and enforcement machinery
established to ensure states' compliance with their obligations
with respect to civil and political rights3 was not paralleled in the
economic and social fields.
t Associate Director of the Center for International Studies and Lecturer at the Law
School, The University of Chicago. I would like to thank Robert Kirschner for reading an
earlier draft and Martha Nussbaum for helpful comments.
' The so-called non-derogable civil and political rights are set out in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Arts 4-8, 11, 15, 16, 18, UNGA Res 2200(XXI), 999
UNTS 171, 174-78 (Dec 19, 1966, entered into force Mar 23, 1976) ("ICCPR").
2 "Each State Party to the Covenant [on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights] un-
dertakes to take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-
operation... to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving pro-
gressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all ap-
propriate means." International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Art
2(1), UNGA Res 2200(XXI), 993 UNTS 3, 5, (Dec 19, 1966, entered into force Jan 3, 1976).
The most significant is the right of individuals, under the Optional Protocol to the
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At first glance, this dichotomous approach appears perverse.
Civil and political rights are considered "first generation" rights,
while economic and social rights constitute a "second generation,"
even though the former presuppose a certain attainment of the
latter-if indeed the two types of rights can be disentangled in
the first place. Access to food, shelter, and basic education is a
necessary precondition for the exercise of freedom of thought; in-
deed, the failure to provide a minimal, life-sustaining standard of
living in the modern world of plenty arguably represents an arbi-
trary deprivation of life.4 The constitutions of the Soviet Union
and most of the old-regime East European states reflected this
thinking by enumerating a wide range of social and economic
rights.
In the West, however, a distinction between the two sets of
rights has been justified by pointing to differences in the feasi-
bility of their implementation. States can establish structures
that protect their citizens' civil and political liberties, but they
cannot create natural or social resources by fiat. Rights to social
and economic goods, while worthy aspirations, are unenforceable.
Enshrining such rights, the argument goes, is therefore pointless
at best, and moreover runs the risk of dangerously discrediting
the worth of other constitutional obligations.5 While this may
well be true for impoverished states, it hardly reflects the situa-
tion of many affluent states where unequal distribution, not
scarcity, is the principal source of deprivation.
In The Community of Rights, Alan Gewirth boldly takes on
these questions. First, he proposes and substantiates a powerful
philosophical argument in favor of the state's duty to provide ba-
sic economic and social rights for its citizens. Second, and per-
haps surprisingly for a philosopher, he cogently elaborates a de-
tailed account of the socioeconomic and political strategies neces-
sary to turn his theory into practice. The book starts with a
philosophical account of the relationship between human action
and rights. It details the nature of positive rights and argues for
the centrality of a principle of mutuality, which links individuals
to the establishment of a just community based on human rights.
The second half of the book then describes, in illuminating and
ICCPR, to present claims of human rights violations to the Human Rights Committee.
For a discussion of the implicit overlap between the two international human rights
covenants, see Craig Scott, The Interdependence and Permeability of Human Rights
Norms: Towards a Partial Fusion of the International Covenants on Human Rights, 27
Osgoode Hall L J 769, 771-72 (1989).
Cass R. Sunstein makes this argument in Something Old, Something New, 1 East
Eur Const Rev 18, 18-20 (Spring 1992), and Against Positive Rights, 2 East Eur Const
Rev 35, 35-38 (Winter 1993).
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convincing detail, how the philosophical argument translates into
concrete policies regarding welfare, education, property rights,
employment, and industrial and political democracy.
Building on his earlier book Reason and Morality6 and
drawing together a substantial corpus of writing by others, Ge-
wirth traces the guiding socioeconomic principles-what he calls
"the economic biography"---that would govern a society concerned
with the protection of individual human rights (pp 99-100). He
argues, in opposition to an adversarial conception of the relation-
ship between community and individual rights, that the two have
a relation of mutual support. Thus, it is a duty of the wider com-
munity (which he identifies with the state rather than the mar-
ket, charitable organizations, or other institutions of civil society)
to promote individuals' ability to achieve a life of freedom and
well-being. At the same time, it is an obligation of individuals,
once they have the capacity to do so, to exert effort to realize such
a life and to aid others in the same pursuit.
The Community of Rights focuses its argument particularly
on those worst off and best off. According to Gewirth, the most
vulnerable members of society-victims of the devastating mate-
rial and psychic effects of prolonged poverty and deprivation, who
are unable by their own efforts to achieve a minimal dignified
standard of living-are entitled to particular kinds of assistance,
such as welfare support, intensive pre-schooling on the model of
Head Start, and public works jobs with child care provided. The
most affluent-beneficiaries of positive socialization and hered-
ity, and consumers of a disproportionate share of societal re-
sources-have an obligation to support such programs, if only
through progressive taxation schemes. For their tax dollars, af-
fluent citizens receive dividends in the form of reduced social di-
visiveness. By eclectically combining a focus on the state's obliga-
tions with an emphasis on individual effort and responsibility,
Gewirth distinguishes his robust social democratic position from
the approach of communitarians, socialists, and liberal theorists.
What sets The Community of Rights apart from other works
defending social and economic rights is its dialectical underpin-
ning. The starting point of the book is that all human action is
necessarily connected with the concept of rights (p 18). Gewirth
advances a deductive argument (elaborated in earlier work) to
establish this. He begins from two assumptions: first, that hu-
man beings can act freely, and second, that they act purposively
to attain "well-being." Gewirth then moves from the human
' Alan Gewirth, Reason and Morality (Chicago 1978).
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rights of the individual to the necessity of rights for all human
beings.
This argument concludes where modern international hu-
man rights law commences, with the proposition that all human
beings (as rational and volitional agents) have inherent dignity
and equal and inalienable rights. Despite its formal deductive
nature, Gewirth's reasoning is of considerable interest for human
rights lawyers precisely because it does not simply assert the
"inherent dignity" of human beings as an a priori assumption, as
does the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or as a cultur-
ally specific construct.8 It is because human beings have the ca-
pacity to act purposively that they have the "inherent dignity"
that distinguishes them from animals, plants or other forms of
life, and require, as a matter of rational necessity, the fulfillment
of basic economic and social rights.9 In the absence of the basic
necessities of life, human beings lose some or all of their pur-
posive ability to act and are therefore deprived of the possibility
of realizing their inherent dignity.
This argument presents a difficulty with Gewirth's thesis. If
being an agent requires having freedom and well-being, then ei-
ther there is no point in claiming a right to these goods because
all human agents already have them, or, given the massive ex-
tent of human deprivation and oppression for many millions
around the world, they cannot be necessary conditions of action.
In response, Gewirth invokes a notion of potentially different
levels of human agency: agents may have freedom and well-being
insofar as they are capable of purposive and rational activity, but
their circumstances may change so that they lose these condi-
tions of action. In other words, it is not inevitable that they will
have these goods prospectively and indefinitely. Hence the neces-
sity of human rights as a social safety net.
Alternatively, the deprivation of the world's poorest people
may be taken to indicate not an inability to act or to achieve any
purposive goals, but a mismatch between capacities and social
conditions; they may well have the capacities but lack an ade-
quate set of social conditions. Typically such populations have
only a limited capacity for purposive activity because they only
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Preamble, UNGA Res 217 A(flI), Doc
A1810 (1948).
8 See, for this approach, Rhoda E. Howard, Dignity, Community, and Human Rights,
in Abdullah Ahmed An-Na'im, ed, Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives: A Quest
for Consensus 81, 83 (Pennsylvania 1992).
' According to Gewirth, the mentally and physically disabled have rights "to the de-
gree to which they approach being normal agents" (p 24). More on this below.
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have access to a basic, minimal level of well-being. But well-being
comprises more than the bare minimum of subsistence; it in-
cludes the ability to have control over one's own life, and to
achieve basic self-respect by virtue of education and the ability to
earn. Without these, human endeavor is inevitably doomed to
bare animal existence. So there are levels of well-being ° and cor-
relative levels of purposive action (p 14).
It is the failure of states to ensure access to this more com-
prehensive well-being for the deprived masses that underlies the
apathy, destructiveness, and low level of productive activity
characteristic of many poor countries. Though The Community of
Rights does not focus on questions of international distribution of
resources, by linking human action to access to basic rights Ge-
wirth's theory avoids the myopic culturalism of some recent ac-
counts of global inequalities. Far from cultural anarchy or civili-
zational clash being at the root of human misery in the non-
western world, as suggested by writers such as Robert Kaplan"
and Samuel Huntington, 2 it is the failure of governments to in-
stitute effective socioeconomic reforms and redistributive pro-
grams that raises the most critical questions facing the interna-
tional community today.
Gewirth's position also contrasts in two key areas with that
of John Rawls, despite their common focus on the situation and
needs of the most deprived members of society. As we have seen,
Gewirth constructs his argument for a community of rights on
the basis of the rational necessity of rights, proceeding by way of
logical deduction. By contrast, the Rawlsian theory of justice
stipulates, as is well known, that any actor must make his moral
choices from an "original position," behind a "veil of ignorance."
Gewirth notes critically that there is an element of contingency
here, because no argument establishes why, as a matter of neces-
" The book details a hierarchy of three different levels of well-being: "basic well-
being" (the essential preconditions of action, such as life and health), "nonsubtractive
well-being" (the abilities and conditions for maintaining one's effectiveness, such as not
being lied to or stolen from), and "additive well-being" (the conditions for increasing one's
capabilities, such as education and self-esteem) (p 14). Though Gewirth does not address
this point directly, presumably civil and political rights, which enable individuals with
the basic material preconditions to act effectively in the world, would fall within the
third, additive level of well-being. For an alternative account of different levels of freedom
and well-being required to act, see, for example, Amartya Sen, Capability and Well-Being,
in Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, eds, The Quality of Life 30, 33-38 (Clarendon
1993).
I Robert D. Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy, Atlantic Monthly 44, 46-68 (Feb 1994).
Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, 72 Foreign Affairs 22, 29-48
(Summer 1993).
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sity, a human agent must accept Rawls's two principles of justice
(p 27).
But surely it is precisely this element of choice that is crucial
in the implementation of human rights. Herein lies a possible
weakness of The Community of Rights. Freedom and well-being
turn from normative abstractions to practical actuality only
when individual citizens, politicians, and governments decide it
is in their interest to move forward and implement them. In most
cases, given the imbalances of power and other resources, redis-
tribution is not mandated by mutuality or any other abstract
principle. Revolutionary disruption and massive social upheaval
do not threaten ruling elites within most countries. Nor does the
position of the wealthy nations in the present geopolitical climate
require them to attend to the well-being of the most needy na-
tions and their citizens. Indeed, Gewirth distances himself from
what he considers an excessively adversarial account of the
power of the disenfranchised to effectively threaten the powerful
(p 122). Instead, he sets out his position in more sanguine terms:
The state, as the community of rights, imposes taxes in or-
der to secure the economic rights of those who are more de-
prived and thereby to narrow the inequalities that subject
them to unwarranted superiorities of power. In this way
rights and community reinforce one another, because these
economic rights are fulfilled through the mutualist provi-
sions of the community (p 179).
But he provides no account of how this extensive economic redis-
tribution-involving progressive taxation and means-tested bene-
fits, for example-is to be accepted as desirable (let alone neces-
sary) by those burdened. Without being unduly pessimistic about
human altruism, it is clear from the present distribution of re-
sources, both within and between states, that the necessity for
mutuality and redistribution has been singularly neglected in the
interests of self-advancement.
A second difference between Gewirth and Rawls points in
the opposite direction. It goes to the question of human achieve-
ment and effort. Rawls emphasizes the need for equal opportu-
nity to access society's basic institutions, but he does recognize
that effort (stimulated by economic incentives) and individual
merit have a proper role to play in determining access to re-
sources, jobs, and other social goods in that society." Gewirth, for
" Gewirth's critique of what he considers to be Rawls's neglect of the responsibility of
individuals to use their own abilities (p 190) confuses Rawls's account of the basic institu-
tional structure that determines people's prospects in a just society (where he does indeed
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his part, stresses the element of individual effort and responsi-
bility as an essential basis for the principle of mutuality under-
lying the community of rights. Once individuals are in a position
to be productive agents-either unaided if they are sufficiently
well-endowed or as a result of the community's implementation
of social and economic rights-they have an obligation to con-
tribute to the community. Only an absence of productive poten-
tial, not a lack of personal effort, can justify welfare dependence.
But while Gewirth characterizes Rawls's position as being
determinist (p 190), he does not adequately explain the genesis of
the individual "effort" on which he relies. Consider Gewirth's
treatment of two key areas where individual motivation relates
to socioeconomic provision: entitlement to welfare and participa-
tion in worker cooperatives. In the first, Gewirth correctly high-
lights the fact that "[m] any welfare recipients come from a back-
ground in which the debilitating effects of poverty have already
left a heavy mark" (p 128). They therefore frequently lack the
psychological attributes necessary to seek work or even partici-
pate effectively in "workfare" and other social programs. The
book sets out a persuasive account of the conceptual and practi-
cal limitations of these programs, a critique that could, mutatis
mutandis, apply to a wide array of state welfare strategies (pp
128-31). Gewirth's solution is a form of social engineering de-
signed precisely to change these individuals' motivational struc-
ture:
It is hence naive to expect that these persons directly have
the emotional and intellectual abilities, including relevant
skills and an effective sense of personal responsibility,
needed to take adequate advantage of the opportunities they
may be offered. In this regard, it is vitally important to seek
out their children at a very early age and to put them into
educational programs in which these debilitating effects can
be strongly countered (pp 128-29, emphasis added).
Given this acknowledged association between institutional
factors and individual motivation, it is not clear what place there
is in Gewirth's account for individual effort as an independent
variable.
Similar questions arise from the analysis of individual par-
ticipation in forms of workplace democracy. In the optimal
worker cooperative employment situation, for example, where
downplay individual effort) with the allowances Rawls makes for inequalities derived
from differential effort or talent. I am grateful to Martha Nussbaum for this point.
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industries are run and owned by the workers and exhibit a
"flourishing kind of socialized entrepreneurship" (p 300), the
solidarity essential to the system has to be developed and built in
by institutional means so that each individual actor becomes, if
he or she is not already, "a reasonable self' (p 304). The inherent
rationality of the principle of human rights is thus a socially pro-
duced realization, which has to be consistently and constantly
taught. Again, this seems to suggest that the motivational struc-
ture required to act in a mutualist manner is irreducibly a prod-
uct of external factors rather than of any inherent individual
ability to exert "effort."
But if the givenness of the individual bearer of rights is
problematic in Gewirth's theory, so too, arguably, is the entity
standing at the opposite end of his analytic stage, the commu-
nity. The problems can be posed in terms of two questions. First,
who is the community of rights to be composed of? Second, given
that our current world includes multiple communities, what is
the relationship of each community to the others?
According to Gewirth, all human agents are bearers of
rights; however, he qualifies this general point in two ways. The
first qualification is a contrast between "normal" agents and
other humans who lack the ability or right to be purposive pro-
spective agents. Mentally and physically disabled humans fit
within this category (p 65) and at various points in the book, so
do "criminals" (p 315). Gewirth argues that the less ability hu-
mans have for productive agency, the "less they are able to fulfill
their purposes without endangering themselves and others, and
this is why their generic rights must be [ ] reduced" (p 65).
This association of rights to agentive capabilities is ques-
tionable, as is the unqualified connection between disability and
danger. True, the freedom (though not the material well-being) of
severely mentally subnormal individuals may properly be cur-
tailed for their own safety. Yet it is not clear that this utilitarian
argument is sustainable for the overwhelming majority of af-
fected individuals. Difference is not the same as danger, though
some may perceive it that way. As Martha Minow has empha-
sized, this sort of vocabulary, "that distinguish[es] the self from
others, the normal group from the abnormal, and autonomous
individuals from those in relationships of dependency... ends up
contributing to rather than challenging assigned categories of dif-
ference that manifest social prejudice and misunderstanding."4
" Martha Minow, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion and American
Law 9 (Cornell 1990).
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Moreover, Gewirth is silent on the question of how to resolve con-
flicts between the interests of the "normal" majority and of the
"subnormal" minority. For example, he does not address the
questions of integrating mentally and physically disabled chil-
dren into normal classrooms, resolving disputes over the siting of
residential facilities for the disabled, and the like. In the case of
"criminals" (presented here as a strangely essentialized cate-
gory), the conflicts with the interests of the majoritarian sections
of the community are even clearer, yet Gewirth leaves the area
completely unexplored.
Gewirth's second qualification concerns the broader question
of who should be part of the "us" of community. Given that the
state has a duty to meet individuals' needs for freedom and well-
being, what criteria should determine the community of benefici-
aries? Who is and who is not included within the polity? During
an era of massive migratory flows, refugee displacements, and
supra-national unions such as the European Union, NAFTA, and
Mercosul, this is an increasingly urgent question. 5 Yet Gewirth
fails to discuss the rights of non-citizens to inclusion in polities,
particularly affluent polities (p 289). He does allude to the criti-
cal issues at stake, for example, in restricting universal social
and political rights to "members [does he mean citizens, legal
residents, physically present individuals?] of societies geographi-
cally demarcated as countries or nation-states" (p 86), but he
does not clarify whether this is a purely pragmatic or a norma-
tive restriction." Though he asks, "i1ow can the resident of Chi-
cago help to fulfill the pressing agency needs that the residents of
Bosnia or Afghanistan or Somalia or Ecuador cannot fulfill for
themselves by their own efforts?" (p 55), he seems to accept as
inevitable restrictive or exclusionary state immigration and citi-
zenship laws (p 294). This omission is significant. The stakes in
having access to freedom and well-being-and the problem of
mutuality-are raised sharply when destitute non-citizens, par-
See, for example, Will Kymlicka's recent discussion of multicultural citizenship,
and particularly his useful distinction between three forms of group-differentiated rights,
in his Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights 26-33 (Clarendon
1995).
" The full passage runs as follows:
The universality here envisaged may be restricted, for reasons of practical con-
venience of effectuation, to members of societies geographically demarcated as coun-
tries or nation-states; but in principle it applies internationally as well. At the same
time, this universality does not militate against the particularism whereby persons
give special consideration to the members of their own families and other partial
groups of friends or colleagues. Such particularism not only is consistent with but is
justified by the universal principle of human rights (p 86).
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ticularly those fleeing persecution, are denied access to more af-
fluent countries.
In a larger sense, the question of ethnic or cultural coherence
or diversity of the polity goes to the heart of one's understanding
of what "community" is. One of Gewirth's models of economic
democracy is the worker cooperative experiment at Mondragon in
the Basque region of Northern Spain. It is clear that the ethnic
coherence and cultural solidarity of the Basque work force, and
the correlative absence of the "vast labor mobility and heteroge-
neity" that characterizes "existing capitalist industrial societies,"
(p 308) were critical components of the project's success (p 302).
Indeed, Gewirth goes on to argue that a reduction in labor mo-
bility is critical to the viability of such projects. But he does not
explore the exclusionary consequences of this model for immi-
grants, migrant workers, and others. 7
This problem raises the broader question of the relationship
between nation-states. While The Community of Rights focuses
unapologetically 8 on the United States, Gewirth refers to the
need for international cooperation and a universalist approach to
the enforcement of the community of rights. He rightly acknowl-
edges the primacy of the individual state as a vehicle for the
translation of moral rights into human entitlements. Other theo-
rists may argue that the nation-state is in terminal decline, 9 but
in the absence of effective international enforcement mecha-
nisms, the state remains the appropriate custodian of the duties
generated by a theory of human rights. Gewirth, however, ne-
glects the complex nature of interstate relations and the critical
effect of these relations on access to human rights.
"7 He cites Switzerland as an example of an existing industrial society where
"community attachments [have] markedly ... decrease[d] labor mobility" (p 308). But
Switzerland has one of the largest foreign labor forces, and its denial of citizenship rights
to long-established migrant workers-particularly Italians-is notorious.
18 Gewirth defends his focus on the United States as follows:
Although the problems, histories and traditions of each country are to some extent
unique, the American experience can be taken to be broadly representative of many
other Western countries . . .insofar as other countries have been developing eco-
nomically according to Western patterns, the American problems can be taken at
least in part to apply to them as well, either in the present or in the not too indefi-
nite future (p 111).
" "[We are in the process of moving to a global order in which the nation-state has
become obsolete and other formations for allegiance and identity have taken its place."
Arjun Appadurai, Patriotism and Its Futures, 5 Pub Culture 411, 421 (1993). See also
Mike Featherstone and Scott Lash, Globalization, Modernity and the Spatialization of
Social Theory: An Introduction, in Mike Featherstone, Scott Lash and Roland Robertson,
eds, Global Modernities 1, 1-2 (Sage 1995); Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cul-
tural Dimensions of Globalization 22 (Minnesota 1996).
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Interstate relations affect rights in two ways. First, affluent
states' policies are frequently a reflection of, or work in tandem
with, massive transnational corporate interests. These interests
operate to the detriment of the majority of residents of underde-
veloped countries, through structural adjustment policies" and
other forms of economic and political domination. Therefore,
much interstate cooperation is principally characterized by a
negative effect on the productive abilities of those worst off. This
reality makes Gewirth's account of possible interstate interven-
tion seem dangerously wishful:
Where governments do not have the will or the resources to
fulfill the rights, they must be helped by other governments,
especially through facilitating processes of democratization
and developing in their own members the abilities of produc-
tive agency whereby they can provide the needed resources
for themselves, and also by making international trade less
subject to domination by richer nations (pp 353-54, emphasis
added).
Such a consensual process is hard to conceive, and still harder to
achieve.
Second, the post-war period has witnessed an increasing
polarization between affluent and non-affluent states concerning
access to human rights protection. This disjunction has become
more marked since the end of the Cold War removed some of the
equalizing checks and balances in the world system. At the same
time that collaboration between states within regional blocs or
economic networks is picking up steam, the processes of exclu-
sion that have long operated between individual states are now
being transferred to larger interstate groupings. Mutuality of a
sort is at work, but only within circumscribed geographically or
economically defined interest groups. Affluent states have made
concerted moves to fortify their common borders against asylum
seekers and to regionalize the responsibility for exilic relocation
within refugees' region of origin.2' Gewirth does not provide an
" These policies are routinely demanded of third world governments by international
organizations such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, in return for
loans and debt forgiveness. The pursuit of free market policies, the reduction of state sub-
sidies, and the economic liberalization associated with structural adjustment all impact
most onerously on societies' most deprived members.
1 For a justification of this position by a prominent refugee advocate and scholar, see
James C. Hathaway, Can International Refugee Law Be Made Relevant Again?, in U.S.
Committee for Refugees, World Refugee Survey 1996 14, 14-19 (Immigration and Refugee
Services of America 1996).
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account of how the principle of mutuality would work in the con-
text of this sort of regionally configured community of rights.
These omissions do not detract from the importance of this
erudite and lucid work. In elaborating his vision of the commu-
nity of rights, Gewirth succeeds in drawing together a huge lit-
erature on the social and economic policies that could improve
the functioning of social democracies. He establishes persua-
sively, with great scholarly mastery of the field, just how crucial
these "second generation" rights are for modern democratic soci-
ety. This book draws together much of the material on which the
critical debates of our times over social and economic policy must
depend. Most usefully, The Community of Rights articulates a
tension between normative and pragmatic considerations, raising
fundamental questions about human rights enforceability, ques-
tions that are as difficult to resolve as they are urgent.
